Quantum tokens

ABSTRACT

Secure, semi-classical authentication schemes are presented. An authentication token is generated by applying a pre-determined measurement to a plurality of random quantum states to obtain a sequence of classical measurement outcomes. The token is validated by receiving the classical measurement outcomes and verifying whether the sequence corresponds to a statistically plausible result for the pre-determined measurement of the plurality of quantum states.

INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE TO ANY PRIORITY APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.15/739,413, filed Dec. 22, 2017, titled “QUANTUM TOKENS,” which is aNational Stage application of PCT Application No. PCT/GB2016/051958,filed Jun. 30, 2016, which claims priority to U.K. ProvisionalApplication No. GB 1511652.8, filed Jul. 2, 2015, titled “FUTUREPOSITION COMMITMENT”. The entire contents of these applications areincorporated by reference herein and made part of this specification.

Any and all applications for which a foreign or domestic priority claimis identified in the Application Data Sheet as filed with the presentapplication are hereby incorporated by reference under 37 CFR 1.57.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to secure authentication. Moreparticularly, the invention provides an authentication token that cannotbe forged and can be transmitted by electromagnetic waves and/or otherstandard means of communication, as well as a method for issuing andvalidating the token.

Description of the Related Art

The redemption of tokens of various descriptions in exchange for goodsand services, access to resources and other capabilities is acommonplace part of life today. For example, money and other forms ofcredit may exchanged for physical or virtual goods; passwords may beused to gain access to certain networks or data. However, in a world inwhich a token-issuing party does not or cannot have implicit trust inthe party receiving the token for future validation, there can be anunderlying desire to ensure that the token cannot be exploited unfairly.For instance, the token issuer may require assurance that the tokencannot be copied and used many times, thereby giving access to moreresources than it is intended to allow. That imperative (and indeed themotivation to the token recipient to forge the token) can and often doesscale with the inherent value of the resource in question.

Accordingly, the provision of a secure authentication token is a knownproblem in the field of cryptography.

Various classical token-issuing schemes exist. Everyday currency is themost immediate example. However, as is known, no standard banknote isimpossible to copy: forgery is a real world problem. Further, where atransaction is characterised by an overriding urgency or otherwise shorttimescales, classical, tangible banknotes and coins are of limited useinsofar as the speed with which they can be transferred from one placeto the next is fundamentally restricted. This property makes materialmoney an asset of limited value in many situations, such as modernfinancial trading networks.

Turning then to virtual tokens, one solution commonly adopted is toissue a password at a first point, P, in space and time (for example, inreturn for payment) that can be used by the recipient as anauthentication token at any one of a finite number of future pointsQ_(i)(i=1, 2, . . . n) in space-time. However, an immediate drawback ofsuch an approach is that there can be no a priori prohibition on thereceiving party redeeming the token at a plurality of those futurepoints: once the password is known, it simply needs to be recalled andrepeated in order to gain access to multiple resources consecutively oreven simultaneously. Because of this risk, the token issuing party mayfeel obliged to check, when the password is returned at a given pointQ_(k) by the recipient in exchange for access the relevant resource,that the same password has not been used at any point either in thecausal past of or space-like separated from Q_(k). This can becumbersome and can incur unacceptable delay, particularly if any of thepoints Q_(i) are space-like separated from one another.

In some instances, the issuing party may determine a unique password(password) for use at each of the Q_(i); ask, at point P, the receivingparty at which future point they intend to use the password; and issuethe relevant password accordingly. However, this approach may beappropriate only in a limited number of circumstances. For example, thereceiving party may not know at which of the Q_(i) they will want toredeem the token being issued at point P. Furthermore, even if he doesknow, he may wish to keep this information private: for instance, if thetoken is to be used to place a stock trade at some point Q_(k) on aglobal financial network, the trader may not wish to give the marketadvance warning of the time or place of his intended trade.

Since the introduction of Wiesner's ‘quantum money’ in 1983 (seeWiesner, S. Conjugate coding. Sigact News 15, 78-88 (1983)), attemptshave been made to exploit the properties of quantum mechanical systemsto provide an unforgeable authentication token. In the simplest versionof the quantum money approach, the token takes the form of a storedquantum state, the classical description of which is not known to therecipient. Since the laws of quantum mechanics dictate that such a statecannot be copied without destroying the original, these solutions areunconditionally secure. The term ‘unconditional security’ is used hereinto refer to security that can be proven by relying only on establishedlaws of physics, provided the protocol is followed faithfully. That is,such security proofs do not rely on the assumed practical intractabilityof a computational problem that can, in principle, be solved.

Furthermore, since quantum states can be encoded in photons of light orother electromagnetic radiation, with sufficiently good technologyquantum money tokens can be sent at light speed: they do not suffer thedrawback mentioned above of classical, physical tokens such asbanknotes. Moreover, known techniques such as quantum teleportation andquantum secret sharing allow quantum states to be transmitted in a waythat allows more flexibility in response to incoming data than would bepossible by sending a token along a single, defined path at speeds up toand including light speed. Some examples of the advantages to be gainedby exploiting these techniques are discussed in Kent, A. Quantum tasksin Minkowski space. Classical and Quantum Gravity 29, 224013 (2012); andin Hayden, P. et al., preprint 1210.0913 [quant-ph] (2012).

Many quantum money solutions have the further advantage of providingboth perfect ‘future privacy’ and perfect ‘past privacy’, innate to manyclassical approaches. By future privacy here is meant that the partyissuing the token at point P cannot know when or where it will bepresented for redemption until the very moment that it is so presented.Thus, the recipient need not disclose details of his future movements inexchange for the token. Similarly, past privacy refers to the ability ofthe recipient to redeem the token at point Q_(k) without unavoidablyrevealing information about his or the token's whereabouts between P andQ_(k): so long as they are stored and transmitted securely, quantumtokens carry no record of their past locations. Future privacy and pastprivacy can be desirable or even imperative not only for individuals butalso, for example, in the context of financial trading, where a recordof past locations of the token implies a record of past locations wherea trade could have been made. Such a record can encode valuable,exploitable information about trading strategies.

However, as is known to those of skill in the field quantum moneysolutions are not, to date, technically feasible: at present, the artlacks adequate technology for storing and reliably transmitting, atlight speed, general quantum states. Progress towards a trulyoperational realisation of a quantum authentication token is likely tobe slow, and it is probable that the technology, even when available,will at least initially be cumbersome and/or prohibitively expensive.Indeed, it is not implausible that the communication of classical datawill always be significantly easier than the transmission of informationencoded in quantum states.

We have appreciated that it would be advantageous to provide anunconditionally secure authentication scheme that does not rely onlengthy storage or transmission of quantum states.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The invention is defined in the independent claims, to which referenceis now directed. Preferred features are set out in the dependent claims.

In its broadest aspect, the invention provides a scheme that usesquantum information to obtain some of the important advantages ofquantum money just outlined, in a way that is technologically feasibletoday. In particular, the token itself in the present schemes isclassical, so that the invention does not rely on the presentlyproblematic long-term storage or transportation of quantum states. Inspite of this, embodiments of the invention provide a token that cannotbe copied, and which is limited in transmission speed only by the lightsignalling bound. According to the invention, the future privacy of thetoken recipient may be respected; and certain embodiments within thescope of the invention may also guarantee past privacy.

According to one aspect of the invention, there is provided a methodcomprising the steps of receiving, at a first space-time point, aplurality of random quantum states, each of the quantum states chosenfrom a set of non-orthogonal quantum states, and applying apre-determined measurement to the quantum states to obtain a tokencomprising a sequence of classical measurement outcomes. The methodfurther includes the step of presenting, at a second space-time point inthe causal future of the first space-time point, the token in return foraccess to a resource.

According to another aspect of the invention, there is provided a methodcomprising the steps of generating, at a first space-time point, aplurality of random quantum states, each of the quantum states chosenfrom a set of non-orthogonal quantum states, and receiving, at a secondspace-time point in the causal future of the first space-time point, atoken comprising a sequence of classical measurement outcomes. Themethod further includes the step of verifying whether the tokencorresponds to a statistically plausible result for a pre-determinedmeasurement of the quantum states.

References herein to events or to the performance of method steps ‘at’ aspace-time point are intended to comprise occurrences within an agreed,small (four-dimensional) region around the relevant point. For example,as the skilled person will appreciate the exchange of informationgenerally requires classical and/or quantum data to be sent throughagreed channels between two nearby secure sites controlled respectivelyby either of the parties to the exchange.

Furthermore, the term ‘random’ is intended throughout to mean perfect ornear-perfect randomness. In preferred embodiments of the invention, thestates are generated perfectly at random with a view to excluding anypossibility that the scheme may successfully be cheated. However, thoseof skill in the field will appreciate that some deviations from perfectrandomness can be tolerated, provided that the bounds on that deviationare known: in particular, slight deviations from perfect randomness donot, materially, compromise security, and are intended to fall withinthe scope of the claimed invention.

Preferably, the quantum states represent quantum bits, qubits. In someembodiments, each of the plurality of qubits may be encoded in a photonof electromagnetic energy or, alternatively, in a weak light pulse withlow expected photon number. The invention in these embodiments mayadvantageously be simple to implement.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Embodiments of the invention will now be described, by way ofillustrative and enabling example only, with reference to theaccompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of two-dimensional space-time,illustrating an exemplary situation in which the present invention findsapplication.

FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating a method of generating anauthentication token in accordance with one aspect of the invention.

FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating a second method of generating anauthentication token in accordance with one aspect of the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

As outlined above, the light-speed signaling bound is one importantmotivation for the invention. In view of this, the present schemes willbe described in a relativistic context, in which some or all of thespace-time points of interest may be space-like separated from oneanother. This is not essential, however, and the more generalapplication of the invention to non-relativistic settings will beapparent to those of skill in the art.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a simplified, two-dimensionalspace-time, illustrating an exemplary situation in which the presentinvention finds application.

A first party (A) wishes to receive from a second party (B) at a pointP=(x₀, t₀) in space and time a token that can she can return to him, inexchange for an asset, at some point Q_(k) in the future of P. The tokenmay be a voucher, password or other encoding of information of any ofthe sorts discussed above for allowing access to a particular resource.For example, in some embodiments of the invention the token acts asphysical money, exchangeable for goods and/or services. In otherembodiments, the token is a password for gaining access to a givennetwork, which may be presented in digital form; in yet furtherembodiments, it represents virtual credit for use, for instance, intrading on a financial network. It is stressed that these applicationsare listed by way of example only.

As mentioned above and as will be discussed further below, in thepresent schemes the token received by A at P is to be valid for use onlyat a single space-time point, Q_(k), in the causal future of P. (Thedashed lines in FIG. 1 denote the light cone originating at P.) In thepresent scenario, A may choose to redeem the token at any one pointQ_(k) that is within a finite set of discrete space-time points{Q_(i)=(x_(i), t₁)}, where i=1, 2, . . . n for some n<∞∈

. In some embodiments, n may be on the order of 10³, though dependingupon the application of interest it may alternatively be many orders ofmagnitude larger or as small as 2.

Importantly, in view of the motivations discussed above embodiments ofthe present invention make no reliance on any level of trust between theparties A and B. It is assumed that A may try to cheat B by, forexample, presenting the token more than once, or by attempting to forgethe token. Similarly, as will be discussed below it is assumed that Arequires future privacy; that is, she does not wish to reveal to B herchosen point Q_(k) until that event itself is actually realised. (Theconsideration of past privacy is excluded in this particularembodiment.)

The following discussion assumes that the token issuer B is moregenerally an ‘agency’, with a network of agents distributed across thepoints Q_(i) at which the token may be redeemed (as well as at point P)and each equipped with appropriate quantum sending/receiving devices andmeasurement apparatus.

In some embodiments, the token user A may also be a similar agency witha similar network of agents. For instance, A and B could both befinancial institutions participating in a global financial network, withtrading systems controlled by human agents and/or computers at manylocations around the world.

Alternatively, A may be represented by a private individual (or a smallset of individuals) who may only visit some of the points Q_(i) and whowishes to keep her (or wish to keep their) movements, and in particularthe token's location, private as far as possible. She may, for example,be equipped with a small device capable of receiving and measuringquantum states sent over short distances. Those states may originatefrom devices, which may resemble automatic teller machines, designed togenerate and transmit quantum states securely and to receive classicaldata in a way that allows them to implement protocols for quantum keydistribution and related cryptographic tasks. Such machines may belocated around the world and controlled by a bank or consortium of banksor some other agency.

In any event, the invention supposes that B's agents operate withcomplete trust in one another and are able to share secret informationsecurely between themselves. Thus, all of B's agents are aware of allquantum data that may potentially have been used to generate the datapresented to them. In other words, the classical description of thestring of random qubits sent by B to A at P is known to all of B'sagents. These data may be either secretly pre-agreed, or sent secretlyat light speed or at the fastest speed practical for the given networkeither before or after generation of the token, but sufficiently quicklyso as to be available at any of the allowed space-time points at whichthe token might be redeemed.

Similarly, A's agents are assumed to operate with complete mutual trustand may also be able to share secret information securely amongthemselves at or near light speed. If light-speed or near-light-speedtransmission is not feasible, then the scheme is still useful but themobility of A's token is restricted. The schemes discussed below give Asecurity based on the assumption that any sharing of information betweenher agents is done securely, and using separate communications channelsto those used by B and his agents.

In communicating with their respective agents, both A and B could useany standard cryptographically secure communications scheme and anystandard communications system. Some embodiments may make use ofone-time pads to encrypt and decrypt the communications in accordancewith Vernam G. S. Cipher printing telegraph systems for secret wire andradio telegraphic communications. Journal American Institute ofElectrical Engineers XLV, 109-115 (1926) so as to ensure theoreticallyperfect security. These pads could be generated ahead of time and/orduring the protocol, for example by using standard quantum keydistribution schemes implemented by commercially available quantumcryptography apparatus. As the skilled reader will appreciate, manyquantum key distribution schemes exist and are known. A recent review isgiven, for example, in Lo, H-K. et al. Secure quantum key distribution.Nature photonics 8, 595-604 (2014).

Furthermore, the present discussion assumes that both parties, togetherwith any agents, have access to standard classical computing devices forcarrying out the appropriate calculations and storing the resultingdata.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a method 20 of generating anauthentication token for use at a single future space-time point inaccordance with a first embodiment of the invention. In a first step 22,party B generates a sequence of N quantum states, chosen independentlyat random. For good security, N is preferably on the order of 10³ orlarger. In this embodiment, the states are ideally qubits realised aspolarisation states of single photons or, realistically, weak lightpulses with average photon number below one. The generation andtransmission of photonic qubits is a well-known technique, details ofwhich can be found, for example, in Lo, H-K. et al. Secure quantum keydistribution. Nature photonics 8, 595 (2014) (and the references citedtherein) and in Lunghi, T. et al. Experimental bit commitment based onquantum communication and special relativity. Phys. Rev. Lett. 111,180504 (2013). In other embodiments, alternative two-level quantummechanical systems such as electrons may be used instead to encode bitsof quantum information in a suitable known manner. Furthermore, thoughqubit implementations are presently preferred for reasons of simplicityboth of exposition and of implementation, the skilled reader willappreciate that the invention is not limited to the use of two-levelquantum states, and still further embodiments may implement the presentmethods using d-level systems such as trapped ions to encode so-calledqudit quantum states.

According to the present embodiment, each of the quantum statesgenerated by party B is a pure state chosen from one of two possiblebases: the computational basis, made up of the states |0

and |1

, where |0

represents a photon polarised in the vertical direction and |1

a photon polarised in the horizontal direction; and the Hadamard basis,comprising the states

$\left. \left. {\left.  \pm \right\rangle:={\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left( {\left. 0 \right\rangle \pm} \right.1}} \right\rangle \right).$This set of four states (referred to herein as the ‘BB84 states’) isgiven by way of example only, and in other embodiments the statesgenerated by B may be chosen instead from any number of (complete orincomplete) bases. A necessary condition is that the possible states arenot mutually orthogonal. In preferred embodiments, the states are quitefar from mutually orthogonal, such as the BB84 states; the six states ofthe protocol described in Bruβ, D. Optimal eavesdropping in quantumcryptography with six states. Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 (1998); or theinfinite number of states described in U.S. Pat. No. 7,983,422.Reference is also made to Bennett, C. Quantum cryptography using any twonon-orthogonal states. Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).

Furthermore, it is not essential for the states sent by B to A to bepure states such as those just listed. Indeed, experimental noise willin practice ensure that the states are not perfectly pure. As those ofskill in the art will be aware, the identification of acceptable levelsof noise and errors is routine.

Thus, the composite state generated by party B at point P may be, forexample, |ψ)=|0

₁|+₂|−

₃ . . . |0

_(j) . . . |1

_(N), where the tensor products between the individual photon states,omitted for simplicity of notation, are implied. Again, the presentembodiment assumes a product state |ψ

for simplicity of discussion and of implementation. However, thegeneration by B of N-partite entangled states for transmission to A isnot excluded provided, as above, that it is chosen from a suitably largelist of states (for example, 2^(N) or more states) that are not close topairwise orthogonal.

Once generated, party B passes or sends the state |ψ) to party A, atstep 24. In this example, since the individual qubit states are encodedas individual photons they may be sent through optical fibre or freespace using standard, commercially available quantum key distributionsending and receiving apparatus. For example, the adaptation of thesetup described in Lunghi, T. et al. Experimental bit commitment basedon quantum communication and special relativity. Phys. Rev. Lett. 111,180504 (2013) to the present schemes is straightforward. To give aconcrete example, B may send to A a string of states in an agreed timesequence that constitutes a short transmission burst (such as 1000states every microsecond within an agreed millisecond, for example).

In this embodiment, the short-distance communication at step 24 is theonly point of the scheme at which transportation of quantum informationis required. The skilled reader will appreciate that, although someerrors may be incurred at this step, errors up to a threshold value canbe allowed for by taking the number N of states to be sufficiently largeto compensate for the associated error probability.

On receiving the composite state |ψ

, A proceeds to carry out a pre-determined sequence of measurements onthe qubit states at step 26. This measurement may take place at P or,should Alice have the technological capabilities to store and/ortransmit quantum states reliably, at a later time and/or at a differentpoint in space. In either case, the choice of measurement in thisexample assumes that A already knows, at the time of measurement, atwhich future point Q_(k) she will want to redeem the token: the way inwhich she measures the state |ψ

is determined based on that choice. The measurements will be discussedin further detail below. At step 28, A then records the measurementoutcome for each qubit classically. For example, she may write down theclassical bits defining the outcomes, or input them to a computermemory. According to the invention, the resulting string of bitsrepresents a (classical) token that A can then take with her throughspace-time to her chosen trade-in point (x_(k), t_(k)), or send to heragent at the point x_(k) in space, to arrive by time t_(k), for futureredemption in return for an asset from B.

Those of skill in the art will appreciate that, in practice, A mayattempt to measure each of the N states but obtain results only for asubset of those states. This may be because of losses in transmission,for example. In some embodiments, A may in this case provide feedback toB in real- or near-real-time about which qubit states produced ameasurement outcome, based on the timings of the positive measurementresults. Thus, for example, she may tell B that she obtained results forstates 2, 5, 18, 23, and so on, in the sequence. Accordingly, the tokenin these cases may comprise only the successful measurement outcomes,and B need only communicate to his agents at each space-time point Q_(i)the classical descriptions of those states. (As will be clear to theskilled reader, in situations in which losses are high the number ofstates generated and sent by B should be sufficiently high to ensure afinal token of adequate length for security, in accordance with thediscussion above.)

As mentioned, the measurements performed by A are chosen in dependenceon the point Q_(k) at which she decides that she will want to cash inher token. In this embodiment, the parties A and B pre-agree a set ofmeasurement strings {{circumflex over (M)}_(i)=M_(i) ¹, . . . ,{circumflex over (M)}_(i) ^(n))}_(i=1) ^(n), each of which will give acorresponding string of outcomes that can be valid only at a single oneof the points Q_(i). In other words, A cannot obtain (by any strategy)two strings of answers that would be statistically plausible results oftwo distinct measurement operators {circumflex over (M)}_(k) and{circumflex over (M)}_(j), j≠k on a state

❘ψ⟩ = ❘ϕ₁⟩₁…❘ϕ_(N)⟩_(N).In particular, by measuring state |ψ

=|ϕ₁

₁ . . . |ψ_(N))_(N) with the pre-agreed measurement operators{circumflex over (M)}_(k), agreed to be those that will generate a tokenvalid at Q_(k), A cannot obtain (by any strategy) a string of answersthat would be a statistically plausible result of any other operator{circumflex over (M)}_(j), j≠k according to the probability distributionassigned by quantum theory on the outcomes of the various measurementson the state. That is, given the state |ψ

and measurement |ψ_(l)

_(l)=|ϕ

each possible outcome of each possible measurement for which {circumflexover (M)}_(i) ^(l)=X on states for which |ϕ_(l)

_(l)=|ϕ

may be expected to occur a given number of times, on average. A's tokenis said not to represent a statistically plausible set of measurementoutcomes for an operator {circumflex over (M)}_(j), j≠k on |ψ

if, after allowing for an accepted level of errors and according tostandard statistical significance tests, the data making up the tokendoes not conform to those expectations in respect of that operator onthe given state. One set of measurement strings that is appropriate forthe set of photonic qubits of the present embodiment, each in one of theBB84 states as given above, will now be derived. It is stressed that thefollowing derivation is given by way of non-limiting, enabling exampleonly, and those of skill in the art will appreciate that manyalternative, appropriate measurements may readily be derived.

As mentioned, A may choose at P that she will redeem her token at anyone of n space-time points in the causal future of P. Writing2^(r−1)<n≤2^(r) for some r∈

, the input state |ψ

may be chosen to comprise N=rS qubits, where S∈

is preferably on the order of 10³ or greater for good security. In thatcase, and writing k−1=b_(r−1)b_(r−2) . . . b₁b₀ in binary form, themeasurement {circumflex over (M)}_(k) ^(l) to be applied to the l^(th)qubit in seeking to generate a token valid at the chosen space-timepoint Q_(k) may be chosen as follows.

Assume that r′S+1≤1≤(r′+1)S for some r′<r, and solve for r′. Then if, inthe binary representation of k−1:

b_(r^(′)) = 0, take  M̂_(k)^(l) = {P̂₀^(l), P̂₁^(l)};b_(r^(′)) = 1, take  M̂_(k)^(l) = {P̂₊^(l), P̂⁻^(l)},Where {circumflex over (P)}₀ ^(l)=|0

0|^(l), {circumflex over (P)}₁ ^(l)=|1

1|¹, =|+

+|¹ and {circumflex over (P)}⁻ ^(l)=|−

−|^(l) are projections onto the BB84 states of the 2-dimensional Hilbertspace of qubit 1, which may be carried out in accordance with anyexisting practical art.

With the measurement strings so defined, security follows because B (orhis corresponding agent) can check that the token presented to him atQ_(k) corresponds to a statistically plausible set of outcomes of themeasurements {circumflex over (M)}_(k) on the state |ψ

=|φ₁

₁ . . . |φ_(N)

_(N) the classical description of which he knows and keeps secret. Itcan be shown that A is unable to operate on |ψ

in such a way, consistent with the known laws of physics, as to producestatistically plausible outcomes for more than one of the measurementstrings {circumflex over (M)}_(i); thus, she cannot cheat by using thestate to generate a token that will be valid at more than one space-timepoint in the future of P. In particular, since she cannot clone thestate she cannot cheat either by carrying out different measurements ontwo or more copies of it to obtain more than one token.

Future privacy also follows, because A can keep her choice of Q_(k)(i.e., of {circumflex over (M)}_(k)) secret until she returns the token.Additionally, light-speed transmission of the token is possible since itamounts to nothing more than a classical string of bits, which can besent by radio waves or by any other known means.

One can easily imagine situations in which A might not know, or prefernot to decide, at P when and where she will want to redeem her token.For example, if the token represents credit for a trade, then A may wantto keep the option of making the trade anywhere in a global tradingnetwork at time t₁, or of waiting until a later time t₂, or a laterstill t₃, and so on. Her chosen location may also be time-dependent, andthis sequence may not be known to her in advance. For instance, tradingconditions at her first chosen point (say, London at t₁) may determineboth whether she should trade and, if not, where she should considernext.

A second embodiment of the present invention finds application in thisscenario. The following discussion assumes for simplicity that A maywant to cash in her token at one of a first set {Q_(i) ⁽¹⁾} ofspace-time points in the causal future of P or, alternatively, to deferredemption to one of a number of further sets {Q_(i) ⁽²⁾}, {Q_(i) ⁽³⁾}and so on, where all of the points in each set {Q_(i) ^((m))} are in thecausal future of all of the points in the preceding set, {Q_(i)^((m−1))}. The application of the present embodiment also extends tomore general configurations, not limited by causal relations in thisway, and the assumption is made merely for ease of illustration. B'sagents at all points are assumed to be able to generate and transmitquantum states as well as receive tokens. The method then proceedsfollowing the sequence 30 outlined in FIG. 3.

In a first stage 32 of the method according to this embodiment, A and Bproceed as described above with reference to FIG. 2. Thus, at space-timepoint P, B generates at step 322 a sequence of qubits and passes those,along a suitable channel, to A at step 324. At step 326, A measures thequbits using measurement operators {circumflex over (M)}_(k), that sheand B have agreed will give a valid token at the future point Q_(k) ₁⁽¹⁾, at which she decides she may want to trade or otherwise gain accessto the relevant resource or asset. Following step 328, at which sherecords her measurement outcomes classically as above, she then carriesthis token with her (or sends it to an agent) through space-time to thepoint Q_(k) ₁ ⁽¹⁾.

On reaching Q_(k) ₁ ⁽¹⁾ at step 34, A decides whether or not to trade inthe token generated at P. If not, B's corresponding agent generates anew quantum state |ψ⁽¹⁾

=|φ₁ ⁽¹⁾

₁ . . . |φ_(N) ⁽¹⁾

_(N) and sends this to A as before.

In some realizations, A may have agents at all Q_(i) ⁽¹⁾ who may allaccept new states from B's corresponding agents at those points. In thisway, B need not be made to learn any information about A's initialchoice of location should she choose to postpone her trade-in of hertoken.

Based on a decision that she may now want to trade at point Q_(k) ₂ ⁽²⁾,A then carries out, at Q_(i) ⁽¹⁾, the appropriate string of measurements{circumflex over (M)}_(k) ₂ on the newly-supplied state |ψ⁽¹⁾

. (Here, it is assumed for simplicity that each set {Q_(i) ^((m))}includes 2^(r) or fewer space-time points, and that the agreementbetween A and B is that A will choose from measurement strings definedin the manner described above each time she receives a new state|ψ^((m))

. This is not essential, however, and the measurements at some or allstages may in other embodiments be different.) The resulting N bits ofinformation represent an extension of the token generated at P, to whichthey can simply be appended to define a new token that will be valid atQ_(k) ₂ ⁽²⁾.

As will be apparent if, on reaching Q_(k) ₂ ⁽²⁾, A again decides topostpone her trade, the process just described can be iterated until shedoes decide to redeem her token. The token grows linearly in length ateach stage. In particular, under the present assumptions, the length ofthe token generated at stage m−1 for presentation to B at stage m willbe on the order of mN. It is noted that B's agents at all points areassumed to be aware of the identities of all strings of states sent,both P and at all intervening points at which A elected to extend,rather than to redeem, her token.

The scheme may be iterated for any number of rounds, limited only bytechnological constraints.

Security can be shown to follow from the security proofs derived inKent, A. Unconditionally secure bit commitment by transmittingmeasurement outcomes. Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 130501 (2012); in Croke, S.et al. Security details for bit commitment by transmitting measurementoutcomes. Phys. Rev. A 86, 052309 (2012); and in Lunghi, T. et al.Experimental bit commitment based on quantum communication and specialrelativity. Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 180504 (2013).

At each stage, A needs to generate a valid set of measurement outcomesfor the new state supplied to her at that stage. Since the statessupplied at each stage are independent, she can only generate two validtokens if she can generate two valid sets of measurement outcomes forthe states supplied at at least one point which, as discussed above, isnot statistically feasible.

The embodiment just described with reference to FIG. 3 offers futureprivacy, but not past privacy: on returning the final token to B atstage m+1, A concedes information about her location at all past pointsQ_(k) ₁ ⁽¹⁾, Q_(k) ₂ ⁽²⁾, . . . , Q_(k) _(m) ^((m)) visited, at whichshe had the option to trade with B. Past privacy for A can be guaranteedby refining the verification of the token, as follows.

In the embodiments discussed above, the token presented by A to B at herfinal chosen point Q_(k) _(m) ^((m)) is simply a classical string ofbits. In a further embodiment, A may instead encrypt the data using anystandard cryptographically or unconditionally secure bit commitmentscheme. Additionally, B presents to A the requirements for a token to bevalid at Q_(k) _(m) ^((m)) (in particular, to correspond to a valid pathfrom P to Q_(k) _(m) ^((m)))) in the form of a testing algorithm. Thismay be a simple list of all acceptable tokens, for example.Alternatively and more efficiently, B could specify the statisticaltests that he would apply to the token presented by A.

Having exchanged this information, A and B in this revised embodimentproceed through a zero-knowledge proof protocol of the sort known in theart and described, for example, in Brassard, G. et al. Minimumdisclosure proofs of knowledge. J. Computer and System Sciences 37, 156(1988). This may allow the simultaneous guarantee for B that the tokenpresented to him is valid; and for A that B learns no information aboutthe path of the token other than its endpoint.

In a yet further variant of the second embodiment of FIG. 3, A maycommit herself from the outset to a given path of points P→Q_(k) ₁⁽¹⁾→Q_(k) ₂ ⁽²⁾→ . . . →Q_(k) _(m) ^((m))), each point in the sequencebeing in the causal future of the one preceding it. In this example, Areceives from B at point P a set of mN random quantum states, and usesthose to obtain an m-part token by carrying out the pre-agreedmeasurements {circumflex over (M)}_(k) ₁ on the first N states,{circumflex over (M)}_(k) ₂ on the second N states, and so on. To usethe token at Q_(k) _(p) ^((p)) for any 1≤p≤m, she simply hands to B'sagent at Q_(k) _(p) ^((p)) the first p segments of the token, in eitherencrypted or unencrypted form as discussed above, and B verifies thatthese define a valid causal path. Once the token has been used andaccepted at Q_(k) _(p) ^((p)) A may discard the remaining unusedmeasurement data.

Thus, a semi-classical form of Wiesner's quantum money has beendisclosed that provides unconditionally secure future positioncommitment. The invention finds application in any situation in whichtwo non-trusting parties must co-operate in such a way that one canfairly and securely purchase, acquire or otherwise obtain from the otheran asset or access to a resource.

What is claimed is:
 1. An agency system comprising: a hardware devicethat generates or receives, at a first space-time point, a plurality ofrandom quantum states, each of the quantum states chosen from a set ofnon-orthogonal quantum states; a measurement apparatus that applies apre-determined measurement, from a plurality of possible pre-determinedmeasurements, to the quantum states in order to obtain a tokencomprising a sequence of classical measurement outcomes, wherein thesequence of classical measurement outcomes is valid at a singlespace-time point; and a communications system that sends the token to asecond agency system at a second space-time point in the causal futureof the first space-time point, wherein the second agency system verifieswhether the token corresponds to a statistically plausible result forthe pre-determined measurement applied to the plurality of quantumstates, before allowing access to a resource.
 2. The system of claim 1,wherein the quantum states are chosen independently randomly from amongpure states of a plurality of possible bases for a quantum state space.3. The system of claim 2, wherein the quantum state space is atwo-dimensional qubit space and the quantum states represent quantumbits (qubits).
 4. The system of claim 3, wherein each of the pluralityof quantum states comprises BB84 states for the two-dimensional qubitspace.
 5. The system of claim 3 or claim 4, wherein each of the qubitsis encoded in a photon of electromagnetic energy.
 6. The system of claim5, wherein each of the qubits is encoded as a polarization state of thephoton.
 7. The system of claim 6, wherein each qubit is represented bythe polarization state of a weak light pulse with a low expected photonnumber.
 8. The system of claim 2, wherein the pre-determined measurementcomprises a projection of each of the plurality of quantum states ontoone of the pure states of the corresponding quantum state space.
 9. Thesystem of claim 1, wherein the pre-determined measurement is applied atthe first space-time point.
 10. The system of claim 1, wherein thequantum states represent quantum bits (qubits).
 11. The system of claim1, wherein the pre-determined measurement is such that possiblemeasurement outcomes give a valid token for the second space-time point.12. The system of claim 11, wherein a probability that the result of thepre-determined measurement gives a valid token for a third space-timepoint separated from the second space-time point is small.
 13. Thesystem of claim 12, wherein the probability that the result of thepre-determined measurement gives a valid token for the third space-timepoint is negligible.
 14. The system of claim 1, wherein thecommunications system encrypts the token prior to sending the token. 15.The system of claim 1, wherein the plurality of quantum states areentangled.
 16. The system of claim 1, wherein the token comprises onlythe measurement outcomes corresponding to quantum states of theplurality of random quantum states, for which the measurements weresuccessful.
 17. The system of claim 1, wherein the communications systemsends data identifying quantum states of the plurality of random quantumstates, for which the measurements were successful.
 18. The system ofclaim 1, wherein the hardware device: receives, at a fourth space-timepoint in the future of the first space-time point and in the past of thesecond space-time point, a second plurality of quantum states; applies asecond pre-determined measurement to the second plurality of quantumstates to obtain a second sequence of classical measurement outcomes;appends the second sequence of classical measurement outcomes to thetoken, forming an extended token; and sends the extended token to thesecond agency system at the second space-time point.
 19. The system ofclaim 18, wherein the hardware device iterates, at each of a pluralityof successive time-like separated space-time points in the future of thefirst space-time point and in the past of the second space-time point,the steps of: receiving a further plurality of quantum states; applyinga pre-determined measurement to the plurality of quantum states toobtain a further sequence of classical measurement outcomes; andappending the further sequence of classical measurement outcomes to thetoken, such that the extended token presented at the second space-timepoint comprises each of the plurality of sequences of classicalmeasurement outcomes.
 20. The system of claim 1, wherein the hardwaredevice generates, at a fourth space-time point in the future of thefirst space-time point and in the past of the second space-time point, asecond plurality of quantum states, and wherein the second agency systemverifies whether the token includes a statistically plausible result fora first pre-determined measurement on the first plurality of quantumstates and a statistically plausible result for a second pre-determinedmeasurement on the second plurality of quantum states.
 21. The system ofclaim 20, wherein the hardware device literates, at each of a pluralityof successive time-like separated space-time points in the future of thefirst space-time point and in the past of the second space-time point,the step of generating a further plurality of quantum states, whereinthe communications system sends an extended token comprising a pluralityof sequences of classical measurement outcomes, and wherein the secondagency system verifies whether the extended token includes astatistically plausible result for each of a plurality of respectivepre-determined measurements on each generated plurality of quantumstates.
 22. The system of claim 1, 19, or 21, wherein the hardwaredevice: receives, at the first space-time point, multiple pluralities ofrandom quantum states, each of the quantum states chosen from arespective set of non-orthogonal quantum states; applies a respectivepre-determined measurement to the quantum states to obtain an extendedtoken comprising a number of sequences of classical measurementoutcomes; and sends a portion of the extended token to the second agencysystem at the second space-time point.
 23. The system of claim 1, 19, or21, wherein the hardware device: generates, at the first space-timepoint, multiple pluralities of random quantum states, each of thequantum states chosen from a respective set of non-orthogonal quantumstates; and sends an extended token comprising a number of sequences ofclassical measurement outcomes to the second agency system at the secondspace-time point, wherein the second agency system verifies whether theextended token corresponds to a statistically plausible result forrespective pre-determined measurements on each of the pluralities ofquantum states.
 24. The system of claim 1, wherein a uniquepre-determined measurement from the plurality of possible pre-determinedmeasurements is assigned to each space-time point.
 25. The system ofclaim 1, wherein the pre-determined measurement comprises apre-determined sequence of measurements based on a pre-agreed set ofmeasurement strings.